Broadcast Law Blog : Broadcast Lawyer & Attorney : Davis Wright Tremaine Law Firm : Broadcast Law Blog : Seattle, Los Angeles, Washington D.C., New York, San Francisco, Shanghai

Any attempt to provide access to in-state television stations to all television viewers implicate the following legal issues:

• Potential issues with the must-carry and retransmission consent process.  Some television stations are concerned that changes could disrupt the retransmission consent process by allowing out-of-market TV stations to be substituted for in-market stations during disputes over retransmission consent fees. Satellite carriers, on the other hand, are concerned that any sort of obligation to carry additional television stations could affect channel capacity.
• Syndicated exclusivity and sports blackout rules are all based on existing DMAs, which could be disrupted if new stations were imported into existing markets
• Copyright compulsory licenses are based on DMA definitions, so issues under those licenses could arise with new carriage obligations

Potential alternatives to the DMA were suggested, though many parties were concerned about the disruption to existing business relationships in the television industry and of long-established consumer viewing habits.  Virtually all such relationships are all based on DMA definitions.  Nevertheless, the Commission looked at alternatives including:

• Market drawn along state lines, a proposal that drew almost universal condemnation for the disruption of existing relationships, and the fact that the proposal would also ignore real viewing patterns based on the interests that center on multi-state metropolitan areas.
• An expanded market modification process that would allow petitions to include a distant in-state signal in a market where that signal provided in-state programming to viewers in a DMA, allowing MVPDs to carry that signal.
• A modified definition of a significantly viewed stations, with implications similar to the option above
• An approach suggested by broadcasters to allow the importation of the news and local programming by in-state stations, but not the network and syndicated programs (an approach criticized by MVPDs who note that this programming constitutes a small portion of any station's broadcast day, and that would leave channels with large amounts of blocked programming, making it unlikely that audiences would find the in-state programs.

This is obviously a very sticky problem, where any solution to help the few people who do not have access to in-state programming may raise more problems than it solves.  The report generated by the Commission is fascinating in the detailed information that it provides about interstate viewing patterns in markets all across the country.  While not putting this issue to rest once and for all, the FCC certainly has provided plenty of information for consideration by those who may want to continue to debate how to help the .02% of the population that falls into this unfortunate hole where they cannot receive in-state television programming. 

ASCAP and BMI, which are the largest of the performing rights organizations - together controlling an estimated 85 or 90 per cent of the musical compositions - are subject to antitrust consent decrees.  They can't discriminate between music rights holders, and must offer the same licenses to similarly situated services, i.e. they must charge all webcasters according to set formulas - they can't cut deals with individual webcasters and offer them better deals, unless such deals are open to all that have similar qualifications.  Moreover, the rates that they charge are subject to government oversight by a "rate court" - a Federal District Court judge who can hold a trial to determine the reasonableness of any proposed rate.  This oversight is required by the antitrust consent decrees that govern both ASCAP and BMI.

As we have written before, SESAC, the smallest of the current PROs, is not subject to rate court review for its rates, nor is it restricted from "cutting deals" on the rates that it charges.  It is a private company, not subject to any antitrust consent decree.  Some music users have, from time to time, suggested that SESAC be brought under such decrees - including a group of TV stations that filed a lawsuit a year ago seeking to impose antitrust scrutiny on SESAC.  As SESAC is often able to require royalties from users that seem higher than those that would be due to it if it was paid on a strictly pro rata basis, these kinds of concerns arise from time to time.

But SESAC is still a fairly large organization, in business for a long time, and most media companies are accustomed to dealing with it.  EMI, and any other publisher that follows its lead, would seemingly be in a position similar to that of SESAC, and not be covered by the antitrust consent decrees.  Thus, any such publisher could charge what it wanted for the public performance right to the compositions that it controls, and even charge different services different amounts.  And it may be difficult for licensees to realize that they have to deal with a new organization or organizations to license music, and it will make it harder to determine which songs a music service has licensed or which ones it already has the rights to use.  Some webcasters are still are surprised that they have to pay SoundExchange, which has been around in one form or another for a decade, so how will they get the word that they now can't rely on ASCAP, BMI and SESAC for all their public performance needs for musical compositions?  While ASCAP's amended regulations (see Section 1.12 of those regulations dealing with this New Media opt-out) provide that ASCAP will must notify all New Media services when any publisher decides to avail itself of this New Media opt-out, and what songs will be licensed directly, as SoundExchange has itself found out, such notices often don't command the attention that one might think that they would. 

Collective licensing was developed to provide a one-stop shop to clear vast catalogs of music.  Many feel that it is necessary for those users - like a webcaster - who needs acceess to a broad array of music in order to operate its business.  When the sound recording performance royalty was first established in the 1990s, it came with a mandatory collective licensing approach (the "statutory license"), so that all users could easily determine how to pay for the music that they use, without needing to deal with every rights holder - perhaps having to negotiate a different deal with each one.  As we wrote here, that is why Internet radio has had the Beatles catalog for so long, even though interactive digital music services, which don't have a compulsory collective license only recently have been able to obtain such licenses.

If music publishers associated with record labels generally start to exercise their rights to withdraw their catalog from the PROs, it's possible that they could even exert more control over the use of the sound recordings.  If, for instance, they control both the publishing and the master recording (the sound recording) rights to a particular band's music, and they feel that the statutory sound recording performance royalties set by the Copyright Royalty Board are too low for a particular recording, they can effectively block the use of that sound recording by extracting a higher price for the musical composition the next time the license for that composition becomes due.  One could even see different prices being charged for the rights to different musical compositions (in fact, most Beatles compositions are held by EMI - so it is possible that every Internet radio operator will not have access to their recordings if this combined licensing scheme goes into effect).   While the efficiencies claimed by the publisher might exist in the case of some interactive services, or in cases where you are dealing with a very limited number of songs (e.g. negotiations to use the music in video productions), for traditional Internet radio services, the efficiencies seem to diminish, not increase.

Just what digital services are affected by this move?  Broadcasters do not seem to have to worry about this development, as the amendment to ASCAP's regulations allowing this partial withdrawal from its licensing system excluded them (and the definition of "broadcaster" under the antitrust conset decree (see Section II(f)), seems to exclude cable and direct broadcast satellite as well, as indicated in ASCAP's press release on the matter.  This exclusion would seemingly include broadcaster's Internet simulcast's of their over-the-air programming.  But other digital music services that are subject to Sections 114 (webcasters), 115 ("DPD", or "digital phonorecord deliveries", i.e. copies or reproductions of musical compositions made digitally) and 106(1) (other digital reproductions by audio services), are all covered. 

This is an evolving story.  There are many questions that remain.  One unanswered question is exactly which songs are covered by this opt-out.  Another is how it will affect the rates charged by ASCAP.  Finally, the practical effect remains to be seen.  It may well be that this new system will in fact prove more efficient, or will provide benefits to users and composers - or it may impose some of the burdens that I describe above.  Until this is all sorted out, music companies will need to watch carefully to ensure that they license the music they need - from the proper places.  More on some of the other issues involved in digital music licensing can be found in our advisory - The Basics of Music Licensing in a Digital World. 

NOTE:  Corrected 5/10/2011 to note that ASCAP, and not the music publishing company, sends out the notices to the services of a New Media opt out when a publisher decides to exercise it right to opt out of the normal ASCAP licensing scheme. 

The question of what is and what is not interactive is not an easy one, as we wrote in connection with the recent court decision determining that the Yahoo! Launchcast service was not interactive within the meaning of the statute, despite having some degree of user influence.  But some services are clearly interactive - where a user can designate the song or artist that is to be played, or set up his or her own playlist, or otherwise specify what they want to hear when they want to hear it.  Services that allow this kind of on-demand listening, including many of the so-called "subscription services" where you can effectively order up the music that you want to hear, must directly negotiate with the copyright holders for the rights to use the music that they play.  And because they must get specific permission from the copyright holder, they may not necessarily get all the access to all the music that a user might want to hear.  Sometimes a label will restrict access, sometimes a band will require in their label agreements that no digital access be provided.  That's one of the reasons that some of these services don't feature all the music that a user might want to hear - no Beatles, no Metallica, and other gaps in the music that they provide.  Thus, if Warner or any other record company decided that they didn't want to provide access to the music to which they have the rights, they could do so.

So, while non-interactive Internet radio services would not, in the US, be affected by such a decision, some on-demand services may well be affected, if the press reports about this decision are true (and applicable world-wide).  And we'll leave the debate about the wisdom of any such decision to others to debate.

The complaint of the sound recording copyright holders (primarily the record companies), is that services like Last.FM use sound recordings as the building blocks of their business, and can amass large audiences based on the use of the sound recordings, yet the record companies don't get a share of the "windfall" that may result when these businesses are sold.  Of course, this argument assumes that the value of these services is primarily in their use of the music.  Under their theory, it would seem that all a service needs to do is start playing music, and audiences (and eventually riches) will result.  Instead, most digital media companies will argue that there is far more to creating a successful Internet service than simply starting to play music online.  If you just had to provide the music and watch the audiences roll in, Internet radio would be a huge business that anyone could enter - and the litany of failed or struggling Internet radio and digital music delivery companies should not exist.  To me, it seems that a service, to be successful, must offer something more than just music, whether it is the community aspects of a Last.Fm or iMeem, or the sophisticated music selection software provided by a service like Pandora.  These sorts of services take much investment and much time to develop audiences, and even longer to develop significant revenue.   And, while these companies may eventually be sold to a company that may better develop and monetize their audience, as happened with Last.FM, the record companies will receive significant royalty revenue if the new owners are successful in the development of the potential of the service.  If they are not successful, one wonder whether there really was any significant value received from the use of the music, and if there was no real value, should there be significant royalties?

The complexity of questions such as these, and the differing perception of the value of music (whether it has intrinsic value on a per performance basis, or whether it really only has value to the extent that it leads to the development of revenue) lead to the debates over the appropriate royalties that the services should pay - such as the debate over the Internet radio royalties that has been going on for the last year.  Given the inherently conflicting views of the value of the music, and the contribution of the other elements of a service, the arguments are difficult to resolve, as there may be no common ground on which agreement can be reached.  Nevertheless, as the industry matures, and there is more and more evidence as to how these services can monetize their use of music, perhaps more rational royalty models can arise - or so one would hope.