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The 15% of revenue charged in this royalty is the lowest royalty for the sound recording public performance right of any royalty set by the Copyright Royalty Judges which is subject to the "willing buyer, willing seller standard."  While the proposed broadcast performance royalty no longer uses the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard that was proposed in the original legislation, the legislation still proposes a standard that looks to the market value of the public performance of the sound recordings, using what is referred to as a "modified Section 801(b) standard", section 801(b) being the section of the Copyright Act that sets out this standard.  Section 801(b) looks at other factors, besides just the market value of the use the music, in setting the royalty.  Factors considered include the relative contributions of the service and the record companies in creating value, and the interests of the public in receiving access to copyrighted music.  However, in the only prior case decided by the Copyright Royalty Judges using the 801(b) standard, the case dealing with satellite radio, the Judges determined that none of these factors were quantifiable.  Instead, the only 801(b) factor taken into account in that case to lower the royalty below the market value that would be established by the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard was the factor that assessed the impact that the royalty would have on the stability of the industry to which the royalty applies.  Application of that factor cut the satellite radio royalty in half (see our post on that case here).  However, in the modified 801(b) standard currently proposed in the Performance Rights Act setting out the broadcast performance royalty, the factor assessing the stability of the industry on which the royalty will be applied is omitted from the test that would be used by the Copyright Royalty Board to determine the royalty for broadcasters (see our summary of the Senate bill here). 

Thus, the 15% royalty agreed to for the new subscription services should serve as a warning to broadcasters as to what they may have to pay if the proposed performance royalty is adopted.  As we wrote in our summary of the satellite radio case, the royalty could even be much higher (as the CRB decision in that case found that the market value of the royalty, before the 801(b) adjustment was about 14% of the satellite services' gross revenues, but that gross revenue includes revenues from non-music programming not subject to the royalty, which the Judges concluded made up about half of the satellite services' revenues - meaning that the Judges perceived the market value of the music to be about 25% of the revenue attributable to the music programming).  Whether the royalty is 15% or 25% of gross revenues, it would clearly be a matter of great concern to music broadcasters. 

In fact, several trade press articles today suggest that the NAB is at least talking to record company executives about a way to resolve the issue in a "revenue neutral" manner.  This would presumably mean that broadcasters would pay no more for music than they are currently paying - seemingly meaning that ASCAP, BMI and SESAC would have to take less than they are currently.  As the current broadcaster negotiations with ASCAP and BMI may well be headed toward a trial, this may be a difficult negotiation.  But, in the world of copyright law, the negotiations all seem difficult, as the users of copyrighted materials and the copyright owners quite often seem to have vastly different views on the value of copyrighted materials, and their relative contributions toward the value of that material.  In the broadcast debate, broadcasters contend that copyright owners would have less value in their copyrighted material without the promotional value conveyed by broadcast airplay, while the copyright owners contend that broadcasters could not profitably operate their stations without the use of the copyrighted music.  Music composers and publishers (represented by ASCAP, BMI and SESAC) also would argue with those who own the copyrights in the sound recordings (usually the record companies) about whether it is the song or the performance of that song that conveys more value.  These debates are not easy ones to resolve. 

We have also seen articles in trade publications that suggest that the broadcast performance royalty issue is dead for this Congressional session, given the other issues that Congress has to deal with, and the over 255 signatures in the House of Representatives on a resolution opposing the royalty.  But, as we have written before, there is still the fear that the bill could be added as a rider to some other piece of unrelated legislation that must pass Congress and against which some of the resolution's signers could not vote.  Clearly, given the Times article, and the continuing push given this issue by the Music First Coalition supporting the imposition of the royalty, broadcasters cannot sit back and assume that the issue is dead.  That was one reason why this was such an important issue on the agenda of broadcasters who visited Congress last week during the NAB's Leadership Conference in Washington, and behind ads that have run on stations over the last month bringing the issue to the attention of the public.  It is an issue that cannot be overlooked. 

Senator Feinstein also identified another issue.  Under the manager's amendment (as in the House version of the bill), a provision of the law would prohibit any use of these royalties as evidence in any proceeding to set the royalties for ASCAP and BMI in a way that would reduce the royalty paid to those organizations to compensate songwriters for the public performance of the musical composition or musical work (the sound recording royalties addressed in this bill go to the performers and the copyright holders in the recordings - usually the record companies).  Presumably, the songwriters' organizations are concerned that high performance royalties for sound recordings could be used by broadcasters or other companies that pay these royalties (webcasters, satellite radio, cable radio or other digital music services) to argue that they could not afford to pay ASCAP and BMI royalties at the levels at which they are currently paid (see our article here, about the potential for contentious proceedings to determine new ASCAP and BMI royalties for broadcasters, where the sound recording royalty is not even a factor yet ).  However, the provision that is now in the bill could be read as prohibiting music services from introducing any evidence about the sound recording royalties to argue that the composer's royalties should be reduced, but would allow such evidence to be introduced by the songwriters to argue that the royalties should be increased.  In other words, the songwriters could argue that, as the sound recording royalties were higher than the composition royalty, and that the composition royalty should be increased - while the music service would be helpless to defend themselves against such evidence as the use of such evidence by the services would be prohibited by the law.  Senator Feinstein suggested that this one way street might constitute a denial of due process to the services, and that a more even-handed provision should be worked out before the final bill is adopted.  There is currently a provision in Section 114 of the Copyright Act, the section that first extended the sound recording royalty to digital services, that prohibits either party from introducing evidence of the sound recording royalty in proceedings dealing with the musical works royalty.

Senator Specter raised another issue.  At Senator Feinstein's urging, the bill proposes to use a single standard to set royalty rates for all services - whether they be broadcasters, webcasters, satellite radio or cable radio.  As we've written before, webcasters have had to pay under a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard, while satellite and cable radio have ended up with far lower royalties because their royalties were decided based on the standards of Section 801(b) of the Copyright Act.  The bill proposes to extend the coverage of 801(b) to all services but, like in the House Bill, the entire 801(b) standard would not be adopted.  As Senator Specter observed, the last of the four factors set out in 801(b) is omitted in the bill - the factor that looks at the royalties to determine if they at levels that will preserve the stability of the industries involved.  That factor was the factor relied on by the Copyright Royalty Board to cut the royalties that would otherwise have applied to satellite radio by half (see our analysis, here).  As we wrote, if the broadcast royalty were adopted, this would be a very important factor to take into consideration in setting a royalty rate for broadcasters.  According to Senator Feinstein at today's session, the record companies objected to the inclusion of this fourth factor, and certain webcast groups agreed to the 801(b) standard without the fourth factor.  Obviously, broadcasters and other services concerned about the lack of the final 801(b) factor will need to push to have this factor included in any final legislation that may be adopted.

Two amendments to the bill were offered by Texas Senator Cornyn, who said that the revisions to the bill with the small broadcaster provisions were a move in the right direction, but he was still concerned with whether the bill went far enough.  One amendment proposed to postpone the effective date of any royalty until the FCC held a rulemaking proceeding and determined that the royalty would not decrease diversity in the broadcast media.  This amendment was rejected by the committee with little discussion. 

The second amendment  proposed that, instead of the royalty, the FCC should establish a "do not play list", a list of artists who did not want their music played without a royalty.  This would address the claims of the royalty supporters that artists are exploited, as they have no right to tell broadcasters that they don't want their music played without a royalty.  Senator Leahy objected to this proposal, saying that it did not provide that artists who were included on this list could negotiate for compensation to be played - that instead it was an all or nothing proposal - either the artist could have its music played for free, or it would not be played at all.  Leahy did acknowledge that the idea was an interesting one that he would work with Senator Cornyn to modify.  The amendment was rejected without much further discussion, but should be considered for the future as debate over this issue progresses, as it may present a potential alternative to the royalty.

All of the Senators who spoke at the session urged the broadcasters to come to the table to negotiate the royalty.  This has been a common refrain at all of the hearings held on the bills in both the House and the Senate.  With a new NAB leader, will the broadcasters actually come to the table?  Time will tell.  But, there is no need to look into the crystal ball to determine that this issue is a real one that the proponents of this royalty will continue to aggressively push forward.   Broadcasters need to stay on the alert, and stay in touch with their Congressional representatives, to counterbalance this aggressive push on a bill that has cleared committees in both Houses of Congress, and may one day come to a vote which will finally resolve whether these bills will become law.

We have written before how, using the Copyright Royalty Board decision that was reached for XM and Sirius in 2007 (and recently upheld by the Court of Appeals), it could be concluded that the "willing buyer willing seller" standard could lead to a broadcast performance royalty as much as 25% of gross revenues.  We reached that conclusion by looking at the CRB decision which set a royalty for XM and Sirius (at that point separate companies) of 6% growing over a six year period to 8% of gross revenues (with some adjustments subtracting those revenues clearly attributable solely to non-music programming).  The CRB reached that decision after finding that a fair market rate (essentially what the willing buyer willing seller standard is supposed to determine) would be approximately 14% of the XM/Sirius revenues (principally their subscription revenues as their music streams were commercial free).  This value was adjusted down to the final royalty to preserve the stability of the industry, a factor required to be taken into account by the 801(b) standard that applies to the determination of the satellite radio (but a factor left out of the House version of the broadcast performance royalty bill).  That 14% of revenue was computed on the assumption that about half of the subscription revenue could be attributed to non-music programming (e.g. news, sports, Howard Stern and Oprah, etc).  So, if the perceived market value of the music in Sirius XM programming was 14% of the total subscription revenue, and half of that value came from non-music programs, then the value of a pure music service would be double that number, or something in the vicinity of 25%.

At the House hearing on the performance royalty held in March, an RIAA witness seemingly implied that the royalty would actually end up being closer to the 6-8% of revenue that Sirius XM now pays.  But recent royalty decisions give one pause about such a claim.  Look, for instance, at the recent settlement between the Pureplay webcasters (some of whom I represent) and SoundExchange, where the percentage of revenue royalties range between 12 and 14% of revenue for small webcasters to 25% of revenue (at a minimum) for large pureplay webcasters.  And this rate is deemed an experimental rate, reached as a compromise and not reflecting the true value of music, according to the SoundExchange press release.

In other services where there is no adjustment made for the preservation of the industry subject to the royalty, the royalty has been high - though perhaps not quite as high as in the webcasters' case.  For instance, in connection with "new subscription services", the audio services provided with DISH and DirecTV video services, the parties planning to provide those services and SoundExchange reached an agreement for a royalty rate of 15% to avoid a CRB hearing.  Even in connection with Business Establishment Services (like Muzak) that do not pay for the public performance of music, but only for the ephemeral copies made in the digital transmission process (the most insignificant part of the webcaster royalty - assumed to be about 8% of the total royalty), the parties agreed to pay a royalty of 10% of gross revenues.  In no case of which I am aware has the royalty for the public performance of sound recordings been set at less than 10% of gross revenues, and then only in connection with "small webcasters," who have revenues similar to those of radio broadcasters who would pay a flat fee under the pending legislation for the broadcaster performance royalty. 

Thus, the conclusion of the CBO, that the broadcast performance royalty would be substantial, seems right on target, unless the new legislation adopts the full 801(b) factors. These factors would have to include the factor looking at the preservation of the stability of the industry which was so important in the Sirius XM decision - the one factor omitted from the standard proposed in the revised House bill. 

Of course, even at 6-8% of revenues, broadcasters will probably find the royalty significant).  But at 25%, in today's economic climate, it would virtually drain the radio industry of its profit margins.  We will be interested in seeing if these factors are discussed in tomorrow's Judiciary Committee hearing.

The Court decision rejected SoundExchange's challenges to the decision of the Board to apply the 801(b) factor which instructed it to take into account the impact of the royalty on the stability of the industry.  The application of this factor resulted in a royalty that grows from 6 to 8%, reducing what might have been a royalty in the range of 13% had the Board relied solely on its assessment of fair market value.  Among other issues, the Court rejected SoundExchange's claim that the XM-Sirius merger should have been taken into account to mitigate against any need for this factor to be taken into account.  The Court also rejected the Board's decision to exclude from revenues subject to the royalty those revenues that came from non-music services, like revenue from advertising on non-music channels or from equipment purchases. 

The only issue that the Court did not resolve was the value of the Section 112 ephemeral royalty - the royalty that is to compensate copyright holders for the temporary transitory copies made in the streaming process, such as those made on servers.  The Board found that no one had shown any value for those transitory copies, and thus the royalty had no real market value, so any residual value was subsumed entirely within the Section 114 royalty.  After the Board issued its decision, the Copyright Office issued an opinion that the Board needed to set a separate royalty for the ephemeral right.  While the satellite radio companies suggested the value was zero, and SoundExchange argued that it should be 8.8% of the total royalty, the Court could find no evidence supporting either position.  So the Court remanded this issue to the Board to determine what percentage of the royalty, if any, should be allocated to the ephemeral rights.

This decision, coming as it does on the date that webcasters announce a settlement with royalties that range from 12% of gross revenues to 25% or more of such revenues, demonstrates again the difference that a standard can make.  The 801(b) standard, taking into account the public interest factors, produces a rate that the music users can actually support (as the satellite companies did here, not appealing the decision of the CRB, but instead arguing in support of it), while the "wiling buyer, willing seller" standard produces royalties which, even after a settlement substantially reducing the royalty, brings only grudging relief.  This issue should be assessed by Congress when it reviews the Copyright Royalty Board's status if, as suggested by this Court, the webcasting court finds the CRB to be unconstitutional. 

Other changes to the bill would apparently delay the effective date of the royalties - delaying the date 3 years for stations making less than $5 million in revenue, and a year for those stations making more than $5 million.  It will be interesting to see the exact language of this provision - as it will likely take several years for the Copyright Royalty Board to issue a decision setting the royalty rates.  Thus, even if the effective date is delayed for broadcasters so they can prepare for the new royalty, they won't know what to prepare for, as they will not know much the royalty will be until well into that period - certainly after the 1 year delay proposed for the larger broadcasters, if the one year period runs from the adoption of the legislation as opposed to running from the date on which the royalty rate is established by the CRB.

From the statements made at the hearing, the standard for deciding cases has also been changed from the original bill - moving away from the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard used in setting the royalties for Internet radio companies toward the 801(b) standard that has been used for setting satellite radio royalties.  We wrote about the difference that standard made in the satellite radio proceeding.  However, importantly, from the comments made by one Congressman, the entire 801(b) set of criteria has not been incorporated in the new bill.  Specifically, the new criteria omit the one factor that was the most important in cutting the satellite radio royalties from what probably would have been 14% of revenue had a "willing buyer, willing seller" analysis been used, down to 6-8% of revenues.  That factor, the potential for disruption of the industry, has apparently been omitted from the criteria to be applied to broadcasters.  The 801(b) criteria were applied to satellite radio and digital cable radio at the time the sound recording performance royalty was first adopted in the late 1990s as these services already existed, and it was felt that the criteria that were being used had to help make sure that these existing businesses were not severely affected by the implementation of the royalty.  Using that same logic, one would think that this factor that has apparently been omitted would be crucial in setting a fair and workable royalty for radio - an industry that has existed for far longer than satellite or cable radio, and which could most certainly be adversely affected by the new royalty.

The committee discussion repeatedly highlighted the Committee members desire to not imperil broadcasters by adopting a royalty - including statement that the CRB would be instructed to take into account, in setting royalties, the impact the royalties would have on minority and female radio operators, small broadcasters, and religious and community stations.  But it was not clear how this expression was to be conveyed to the Board.  The exact wording used is crucial as, from their analysis in the satellite radio decision, the CRB takes its direction from the precise words in the legislation, and applies the standards of 801(b) in a very narrow way.  In fact, the Board found that most of the 801(b) considerations were immaterial in reaching to their decision - only taking into account the potential impact on the stability of the industry as having any decisional impact.  Thus, the wording of the instructions to the Board will be crucial.

There is much to be learned from the precise wording of the Bill, and we will address those issues in coming days, and address in more depth some of the issues raised at the hearing.  But it is clear that we have not seen the last of this debate that will continue to evolve over this Congressional session.  But, from today's decision, it is clear that there is a real prospect that a performance royalty could become a reality, and radio broadcasters must consider that potential in developing their business plans for the future, and in their interactions with their elected representatives in the next weeks and months.

In the webcasting case, there were also numerous arguments about the appropriateness of the decision on the rates.  The large webcasters argued that the Board used flawed reasoning to arrive at the rates that were determined, the Small Commercial webcasters contended that the Board should have adopted a percentage of revenue royalty rate as they would otherwise be put out of business, while noncommercial webcasters submitted that a flat fee was the appropriate royalty.  SoundExchange and the Department of Justice lawyers who represent the CRB of course disputed the contentions.  Broadcasters and NPR were absent from the appeal given their recent settlements with SoundExchange on Internet radio royalties (see our posts here and here). 

The satellite radio argument was in many ways the opposite of the Internet radio case, with SoundExchange contending that the rates that were arrived at by the Board should have been higher, while the Department of Justice defended the CRB decision, and Sirius XM arguing in support of the DoJ.   One of the interesting aspects of this case was that the argument did not focus on what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree was the proper price of music (the argument in the Internet radio case), but instead whether the CRB adjusted that rate too greatly to protect the economic viability of the satellite radio industry.  As we've written before, the satellite radio case was judged by the 801(b) standard of the Copyright Act, which considers not only the perceived "value" of the music, but also the impact that any royalty would have on the service paying that royalty and on the public's interest in receiving the music.  Internet radio, in contrast, while paying for the same right to publicly perform the sound recording, is judged by a different standard - the willing buyer, willing seller standard that looks only at the economic value of the music.

The decision of the Court in these cases may be many months away.  Many interested parties may be looking at that decision - not only the parties to these cases, but also all others subject to the CRB's jurisdiction (and those who may be subject to it - like broadcasters should a performance royalty on over-the-air broadcasts be adopted).  Stay tuned....

The Petitions to Participate can be filed either by individual parties interested in participating in the case, or jointly by parties with common interests.  Section 351.1 of the CRB rules require specific contact information for the participant, and a statement of the interest of the party filing the request in the proceeding.  A filing fee of $150 per petition is also required.  In the next month, there may be the formation of various interest groups ready to participate in this next proceeding.  These proceedings are long and expensive, so the formation of groups to jointly participate are often the only way for Internet music services can afford to participate in these proceedings. 

At the same time, the CRB noticed the start of a proceeding for the royalty for "new subscription services."  These services include subscription digital music services not provided over the Internet, and not in existence in 1998 when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was adopted.  Services that were in existence (like the satellite radio services that were authorized by the FCC when the DMCA was adopted and certain cable music services) are referred to as the "pre-existing subscription services" and are not governed by the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard that govern webcasting royalties.  These services, unlike Internet radio, cannot measure exact listenership.  Services that came later, such as music services provided by XM and Sirius to the satellite television systems, are the "new subscription services."  In 2007, they negotiated a 15% royalty to cover the period through 2010. If they cannot reach an agreement on a new rate, they, too, would have to participate in a new proceeding to determine the royalties that they will pay for 2011-2015. The filing date for these services to partipate in the proceeding to set rates is also February 4.

So the fun starts again - get ready to litigate.

If this stratagem were to succeed, there may be an impact far beyond this particular game. In any decision of the Copyright Royalty Board as to the value of music in assessing what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in a marketplace, the Board has always assumed that there would be some agreed upon value of music, as interactive or on-demand providers of music, such as video game makers, have traditionally paid for the use of the music they feature. Were this paradigm to change, music services could well argue that Internet radio and other services that are subject to the royalty should pay little or nothing for that royalty given the promotional value that they deliver. Of course, part of any such analysis would be proof. In the case of Guitar Hero, which features a limited selection of music, Activision can show that the sale of the featured music climbs coincident with a new release of a version of the game that features that music. Internet radio, on the other hand, which features a wide variety of music over a prolonged period, music that may also be featured on other services, has a harder time demonstrating the direct connection between airplay and music sales. But tests could be conducted (see RAIN’s proposal for the Three Dog Night test, here). It may very well benefit companies to conduct such tests before the next CRB proceeding, scheduled to begin next year.

The second bill that was being discussed was that of Senators Brownback and Wyden (who were both at the hearing, the former asking questions and the later as a witness) - the Internet Radio Equality Act (about which we have written here and here) which would lower Internet radio royalties to 7.5% of revenue and adopt the 801b standard for future proceedings.  As the bills propose different standards for music royalties, one area of disagreement was immediately evident.  Yet, as Senator Feinstein pushed the parties to find a compromise, a glimmer of hope actually appeared.  

The record company representative on the panel, Jeffery Harleston of Geffen Records, held firm for the "fair market value standard," arguing that if artists and labels are forced to license their product through a compulsory license, it is only "fair" that they receive the value that their work would have brought had they been able to license it in the marketplace - so a "fair market value" rate was appropriate to provide that compensation.  While the issue was not raised in the hearing, one wonders why, if the record companies believe that this standard is the only "fair" one when a compulsory license is involved, they don't advocate a change in Section 115 of the Act - the compulsory license that record companies rely on to get rights to reproduce the composition of a song when making a recording of that song.  Record companies and artists do not need to negotiate with music publishers for the rights to use a composition, but instead they can get that right through a compulsory license - and the royalty to be paid by the record companies under that license is set using the 801b standard.  So if record companies and artists use 801b when it benefits them, shouldn't the same standard be used when their product is the one subject to the license?

On the other hand, Joe Kennedy of digital music service Pandora, testified that the 801b standard, as used for all other royalties under the Copyright Act, should also be applied to the performance royalty in a sound recording.  Kennedy argued that, given the difficulty of the application of the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard to Internet radio (stating that the royalty currently takes 75% of Pandora's gross revenues and, if not changed, will definitely force the company out of business as the royalty increases over the next two years), it seemed difficult to justify the adoption of yet another new standard - "fair market value" - which has never been used in the past.  What Kennedy did not specifically state, but which seems evident from the fact that the recording industry is supporting this new standard, is that this new standard is likely to be interpreted much like the "willing buyer, willing seller" standard which already purports to assess the economic value of  music in an arms-length negotiation in an open marketplace.  That would seemingly be the same thing as "fair market value" of the music.

One point that was lost in the discussion was the meaning of the 801b standard, with some of the Senators in attendance admitting that they did not understand that standard and how it was applied.  What is the 801b standard?  The standard looks at a number of factors in assessing what the proper royalty should be.  Those factors are:

(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public.

(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions.

(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication.

(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.

As is evident, those factors not only look at the economic value of the use of the work, but also assess the public interest in the distribution of artistic and literary works and the impact that the royalty will have on the industry that has to pay it.  Just as the impact of the Section 115 royalty would have on the record companies must be assessed in looking at that royalty, the impact on the digital music businesses would have to be assessed in determining a rate decided under this standard.  In using the 801b factors in assessing the satellite radio royalties, for instance, the CRB reduced a willing buyer willing seller determination of 14% to a rate climbing from 6% to 8% of revenues over a 5 year period, justifying the reduction on the impact that the royalty would have on the business of the satellite radio companies if it were not so adjusted (see our previous post for more details). 

So - where was that glimmer of hope?  As Senator Feinstein pushed the parties on the panel to find a compromise standard so that the legislation could be moved this session, John Simson, the President of SoundExchange (the collective which collects the royalties and distributes them to artists and labels), actually broke ranks and stated that he did not rule out the use of the 801b standard.  However, he said that he thought that the standard would need to be tweaked to reflect current marketplace realities.  His specific example of where that tweaking could occur was in assessing the "substitution" issue - whether the use of the copyrighted work by the digital service would be a substitute for its purchase, thereby diminishing the income that the artist might receive from the use of the sound recording.  Of course, it would seem that the existing factors already take that into account in assessing the "risks" to various parties under consideration (C) above, the impact on the structure of the businesses that are involved in the proceeding under consideration (D), and the fair return under clause (B).

The purpose of the Copyright laws, under the Constitution, is "To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."  Many commentators (see this article, for instance) state that the meaning of "science" at the time of the Constitution was much broader than it is today meaning, more generally, "knowledge and learning."  While creators are given limited exclusive rights, those rights are for purposes of promoting general knowledge within the community - not exclusively for the protection of the copyright holders.  If this interpretation is the correct one, then it seems like the Section 801b factors are exactly what is meant by the purpose of Copyright - insuring a fair return, but also allowing for the reasonable distribution of the copyrighted material so as to benefit the knowledge of the general population.  This, of course, leads into the discussion of the differing views of the purpose of the statute and of the state of the industry - issues both discussed in detail at the hearing - and to be covered in subsequent posts on this blog.

Also, this rate covers only these three Internet services, and only covers ASCAP.  Of course, the decision may be instructive as to the rates that would apply to other similar companies (and potentially for BMI rates in the future, as they also are subject to a consent decree - though SESAC is not).  However, most Internet companies, especially smaller companies that cannot afford expensive rate court litigation, are paying royalties under the "experimental licenses" that ASCAP posted on its website (and which have rates somewhat lower than the decision here for non-interactive services, and somewhat higher for interactive services), and should not, for the time-being, be affected by this decision. 

While this decision involves a different right than does the CRB decision for somewhat different types of services, the rights are similar, yet the approaches taken by the Court here and the CRB in the setting the sound recording royalty were quite different.  For instance, one of the criticisms of the CRB decision, especially by the small webcasters that I represented in the proceeding, was that the CRB refused to adopt a percentage of revenue royalty, finding it difficult to compute what revenue was to be included as being subject to the royalty and because it did not represent a payment for all of the music used.  The CRB found that a per performance (e.g. per song, per listener) rate was more appropriate as it insured a fair return to the copyright holder in the sound recording even by a service that did not maximize its revenue.  Under a percentage of revenue royalty, the CRB determined, there might be minimal payments for the use of music.  Here, however, the Court found almost exactly the opposite,  concluding that a percentage of revenue rate appropriate for the following reasons:

• It was economically efficient, as it did not provide any disincentive to a service not to use music as might be the case for a royalty that demanded a per performance fee
• It adapts to changing conditions, as it will collect more when a service makes more revenue and less when a service has hard economic times, thus taking into account changing economic and competitive conditions, variations in financial fortunes and changes in technology and other unforeseen changes in the circumstances of the services that may occur over time
• Revenues were simple to verify as information about total revenues were routinely collected by a service
• That these royalties provided the kinds of efficiencies expected for a blanket license - easy administration, that covered all rights to all the music represented by ASCAP, and gave the service certainty as to its music costs so that it did not need to take royalties into account in deciding how to introduce any new aspect of its service

By contract, the new CRB rates require many services to pay based on performances, a metric that many services don't currently track, and which many may not be able to accurately count (see our post here).  The CRB royalties also are such that they the webcaster must carefully consider them in making any decision as to whether or not to launch any new service as, if that service attracts listeners but not revenue, the service could owe significant fees without having earned the revenue to pay for the music use.  The per performance royalty does not adjust to changing economic conditions, either, as it remains at the level set by the CRB, regardless of the ability of the service to monetize the use of music or changing economic and competitive conditions.  In effect, the per performance royalty does not encourage the use of music, as evidenced by many of the larger services that are reportedly limiting their listening or (as in the case of AOL), getting out of the Internet radio industry entirely (see our post here).

The Court in the ASCAP case stated that deciding the marketplace value of music under a blanket license like the one at issue here is a difficult process, as there really are few if any real examples of what a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to.  The existence of the blanket license and the threat of a rate court proceeding itself distorts the market, and contributes to results of any voluntary deal that is negotiated for similar rights.  And the consideration of benchmark royalties negotiated for other services (a number of which were considered here) all have some differences with the situation at hand, meaning that some sort of inexact and hypothetical adjustment must be done to use the benchmark to determine the rate applicable in the pending case.  Regardless of whether or not one thinks that the decision reached in this case was the correct one, the considerations that went into reaching the rate are ones that might be instructive for future cases involving the CRB's decision on the sound recording royalty. 

In the denial of the rehearing motion, the Board rejected SoundExchange's request that the royalty adopted by the Board excluded too much of the revenue of the services.  In the decision, the Board determined that advertising and other revenues specifically tied to those channels with no music, or where music was just incidental to the service provided, could be excluded.  As much of the music programming provided by these services is commercial free, much of the advertising revenue could be excluded from the revenue computation.  However, the Board pointed out in its decision that the advertising revenues constitute but a very small part of all revenues of the services (by far the largest coming from subscriptions), so the exclusion of this revenue would not make a significant difference in the royalty.  The Board also alludes to an argument that, as the non-music services do not rely on sound recordings, and as it could not be said that listeners come to these non-music services only because of the use of sound recordings on other music channels provided by the services, there was no reason to include the revenues that come specifically from the non-music channels in the base from which the royalty for the use of music is assessed.

In the initial decision, the Judges distinguished the percentage of revenue royalty used in satellite radio from that used in the Webcaster decision, finding that in the Webcaster case, there was difficulty in determining what revenue would be subject to the royalty.  In doing so, the CRB ignored the formulation offered by the Small Webcasters in the Internet radio case who had proposed a more inclusive royalty than that adopted in this case - a royalty on the entire amount of revenue that a service generated.  The satellite radio companies offer different lines of business not subject to the royalty (selling equipment, data services, and music services to satellite television companies) and have the issue of many channels that do not feature music, requiring the rate adjustments discussed above, while the Small Webcasters generally do not offer such other lines of business.

The rate that was set for the satellite radio services was based on a process similar to that which they used for setting the Internet radio royalty - the Board looked for comparable marketplace transactions on which to base a rate.  In assessing the rates that would be charged to the services in a marketplace transaction, the Board came up with a 13% rate.  That rate would be higher - probably over 20% - if it was based on just music programming.  But as a significant part of the satellite radio programming is not music oriented, the percentage of revenue (principally the subscription revenue) was adjusted to conclude that the sound recordings were worth about 13% of the services gross subscription revenues in a marketplace transaction.  However, as Section 801(b) applied to this case, the Board looked at the possible disruption to the satellite radio services that would occur if that rate was to be applied.  As the Board found that a 13% royalty would cause substantial disruption, it adjusted the rate to one that begins at 6% and increases to 8% over the term of the royalty.

This computation has significant implications for broadcasters who may be concerned about a potential performance royalty on over-the-air radio for its use of sound recordings.  The currently pending performance royalty bills recently introduced in Congress propose a willing buyer, willing seller model.  If those bills were adopted, and the same methodology were applied to broadcast radio as was used here, music radio might well end up with a 20% royalty (which we suggested was what SoundExchange might seek, see our post, here).  Imagine what such a royalty would do to the business of terrestrial radio - if 20% of music radio revenues were skimmed off the top to go to pay a performer's royalty.

The final issue raised by SoundExchange's rehearing motion was the claim that the Board should have taken into account the planned merger of the satellite radio companies, and their potential for cost-savings and increased profitability, which should have been factored into a lessening of the adjustment made to account for the potential disruption.  The Board rejected this argument, finding that the savings (and the merger itself) were speculative, and could not be assessed at this time. 

A close reading of the decision and rehearing denial should be of interest to broadcasters interested in what a sound recording royalty could do to their businesses, to webcasters to see what a difference a standard makes in determining a royalty, and by those interested in fairness in music licensing.  While SoundExchange is arguing to Congress about the "unfairness" of radio not paying a royalty when digital services do, no one seems to recognize the inherent unfairness of differing standards as applied to different services.  Even the new broadcast performance royalty bills perpetuate that unfairness - allowing broadcasters with less than $1.25 million in revenue to pay a flat $5,000, while webcasters with the same revenue would pay royalties twenty-five times that amount, even under the small webcasters deal offered by SoundExchange (see our post here).  Where is the fairness in music licensing?

This settlement applies only to subscription services of a particular type.  This proceeding was begun when XM, Sirius and MTV all announced plans to offer audio services that are provided  as an add-on to a subscription to multichannel video providers (essentially cable and Direct Broadcast satellite television providers).  As these services cannot technologically track individual performances or listeners, they cannot pay according to the Internet radio decision.  Thus, a new proceeding was begun by the CRB to determine the rates to be paid by these services. 

Internet-based subscription services are not covered by this decision, but instead pay the royalties that apply to Internet radio services that were decided in March - if the subscription service is non-interactive (i.e. a listener cannot pick what songs he wants to hear) and otherwise meets the rules that apply under the statutory license (see our memo, here, for the details of those requirements).  Internet-based services that are interactive or otherwise don't meet the requirements of the statutory license must obtain clearances directly from the copyright owners, paying a privately negotiated rate. 

The fact that two settlements, one providing rates that are double the amount of the other when the only effective difference between the services was whether they were in existence at the time the governing statute was written fuels complaints about the arbitrary nature of the Copyright Royalty process.  While SoundExchange and other copyright holders have asked for "fairness" in seeking a performance royalty on broadcasters (who currently do not pay such a royalty), they benefit from the unfairness in circumstances such as this, when identical services pay royalties that are twice that paid by existing services.  And, to the extent that all services are deemed to be part of a single broad market for audio services, as some have argued, is there really justification for different treatment between subscription, nonsubscription, Internet and non-Internet based services?  When the rates that apply to satellite radio are decided in the next month, will we see these differences manifest themselves yet again?

These are not questions for the Copyright Royalty Board to decide - they only need to approve this agreement and are not charged with the broader responsibility of assessing the difference in policy between similar services.   Comments on this settlement are due on December 10.

One might suggest that there is something special about Internet radio that makes the music industry think that the royalty should be higher for those services than for broadcast radio.  But the proposals made for royalties in other digital services echo the proposals made for Internet radio.  For instance, in the current proceeding for royalties for satellite radio and the "pre-existing subscriptions services" (e.g. digital cable music services), the royalties requests were much the same as for Internet radio.  The SoundExchange proposal can be found in the executive summary of the case it filed with the Copyright Royalty Board.  There, they suggest a royalty of 10% of satellite radio's gross revenue for 2007, rising to 23% of the satellite radio services' gross revenue for 2012, the last year of the royalty period for those services.  For cable radio, SoundExchange proposes a royalty beginning at 15% of revenue for 2008 and increasing to 30% of cable radio's gross revenue for 2013, the last year of the royalty period for those services.  Are these proceedings also anomalies?

Together with the proceeding for satellite and cable radio, the Copyright Royalty Board is also hearing a case for the royalties that apply to "new subscription services" including music services to be provided by XM and Sirius to Echostar and DirectTV.  In those services, too, SoundExchange has also requested a royalty of 30% of revenues.  A copy of the Executive Summary of their proposal can be found here.

Thus, SoundExchange, a member of the Music First coalition and the principal agent for the collection of performance royalties for sound recordings, has consistently requested royalties in the range of 30% of gross revenues - far in excess of the 3 to 5% claimed by the Music First spokesman.  Do actions speak louder than words?