The Debate Over Sirius' Attempt to Directly License Music - SoundExchange Once Said A Marketplace Negotiation to Adjust for High Rates "Was to Be Expected"

There have been many reports about the attempts by Sirius XM Radio to license music directly from record labels, bypassing any royalty rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board.  Direct licensing would have Sirius pay the record labels or copyright holders for the rights to use music, avoiding any dealings with SoundExchange, which normally collects the royalties for the public performance of sound recordings under the statutory license.  The most recent report about Sirius' efforts was in the New York Times, here.  Sirius, like webcasters, pays royalties set by the CRB (if they cannot be negotiated among the parties) that cover the public performance of all legally released sound recordings.  While webcasters currently have royalties that are in place through 2015, the royalties for Sirius end in 2012, and are being litigated now (see our story here on the last royalties set by the CRB for Sirius).  To avoid the uncertainty of litigation, with which webcasters are very familiar, Sirius has been attempting to license music directly from the copyright holders.  This is not a new story - Rhapsody reportedly tried the same thing earlier this year, and Clear Channel tried to get royalty waivers from independent artists several years ago in exchange for more exposure for their music (see our stories, here and here).  Each time a music service suggests that it might want to license music directly to try to recognize some savings over the rates established through CRB litigation, the music community objects - see, for instance, the statements of unions AFTRA and AFM here, that of SoundExchange here, and that of A2IM (the association of independent record labels), here.  But what is really wrong with the efforts of services to negotiate lower royalties?  If you believe the testimony of SoundExchange's own witness in the Copyright Royalty Board proceedings - nothing at all.  In fact it is to be expected. 

In the CRB proceeding that was held in 2005-2006 (and from which, most of the settlements arose that now govern the royalties for sound recordings played by Internet radio stations), SoundExchange relied on a number of witnesses, including one expert, Michael Pelcovits, an economist whose model was the principal testimony relied on by the CRB in establishing the rates they determined to be reasonable.  In his written testimony, Mr. Pelcovits stated as follows:

...a rate that is set too low may have serious economic dangers.  By setting a rate too low, inefficient entry may be encouraged, and inefficient levels of production will be encouraged, which can hinder the development of an efficient market.  It is also worth noting that setting the statutory rate too high will not necessarily be harmful to the market.  If the price is too high, parties can (and are almost certain to) negotiate agreements for rates lower than the statutory standard.  Thus, a rate that is set too high is likely to "self-adjust" because of the sellers' natural incentive to meet the market. 

(Emphasis added).  The statutory rate referred to in this quote is the rate that is set by the CRB.  What this quote says is that, if that rate is set too high, then parties will naturally negotiate after-the-fact to try to find what the real market rate should be, and that such negotiations should be expected - not feared as many seem to be claiming as these attempts to cut deals come to light.  In other words, the music community seemed to favor (and expect) such negotiations, before they were against them it in their statements today. 

In fact, it is quite clear that the negotiation of lower rates has already happened.  In the many settlements that came about after the CRB decision on Internet radio rates was released after the 2006 proceeding, while the parties were fighting appeals and pursuing Congressional redress, rates lower than those that were set by the CRB were negotiated by many parties, including the Pureplay webcasters (on which Pandora relies), small webcasters, noncommercial webcasters, and even broadcasters (see our summary of the rates under all these deals, here).  All of these settlements were deals that were negotiated, as Dr. Pelcovits put it, "to self-adjust....to meet the market."  Clearly, the CRB rates are not sacred.  So what is the difference between these deals done pursuant to the Webcaster Settlement Acts, and the deals that have been tried now and have been condemned by so many in the music community? 

One possible difference is the loss of control. The settlement deals that were done under the Webcaster Settlement Acts all provided SoundExchange with the opportunity to decide which deals were precedential in future CRB proceedings, and which could be excluded from future rate-setting cases.  So, as we've written before (here and here), the deals that set relatively low rates, like those with the Pureplay Webcasters and the small webcasters, were deemed non-precedential, while those deals with higher rates, like the agreement with the Broadcasters, were considered precedential - and in fact contributed to the CRB decision in 2010 setting the rates for 2011-2015 for those webcasters not covered by one of the WSA settlements.  Deals that are marketplace deals would not be afforded the non-precedential status afforded the WSA deals absent some new act of Congress.

In establishing the statutory royalty, Congress envisioned that the CRB would base its decision on the rates set by the marketplace for similar rights.  In previous cases, because there were no freely negotiated marketplace rates (except for those recently done under the WSA and deemed "precedential"), the Copyright Royalty Judges had to rely on economic analysis of royalty schemes for other types of service and to come up with proper "adjustment factors" so as to determine the hypothetical rate that would be negotiated had these parties been negotiating rates for noninteractive webcasting.  Obviously, this is an inexact science, and has led to some results that many have argued are too high (though, as the SoundExchange press release indicates, some in the music community believe that the rates are too low).  Having freely negotiated rates may well provide some "real" basis for determining what a willing buyer and willing seller really would pay for music in a real marketplace.  But we will see if any such rates can in fact be negotiated by Sirius or any of the other parties that have attempted such negotiations. 

Final Webcasting Royalty Rates Published - A Comparison of How Much Various Services Pay

Last week, the Copyright Office published in the Federal Register the final decision of the Copyright Royalty Board on the statutory rates for Internet radio royalties - royalties paid by webcasters for the noninteractive streaming of sound recordings.  As we have made clear before, these are royalties that are paid in addition to the royalties paid to ASCAP, BMI and SESAC for the public performance of the musical compositions (see our memo on Using Music in Digital Media, here, that explains the difference between the sound recording and musical composition royalties).  The rates adopted by the CRB are the rates to be paid by any webcaster who has not elected alternative rates available under one of the many settlement agreements between SoundExchange and groups of webcasters, which were entered into under the Webcaster Settlement Acts.  The Final Decision corrects a few typos in the initial decision, but otherwise leaves the substantive holdings of the decision unchanged.  We described those holdings here.  While the publication of the final decision starts the clock running on filing an appeal, the new rates are unchanged from those that were in effect for 2010 for commercial webcasters who had not elected any available alternative set of rates.  Thus, these webcasters will continue to pay at the rate of $.0019 per "performance" (a performance being one listener listening to one song - e.g. if there are 100 people listening to a stream that plays 10 songs in an hour - there are 1000 performances in that hour) for the remainder of 2011.   The publication of these rates has, however, triggered a number of questions about the comparative royalties that different Internet radio services pay for streaming music on the Internet - rates summarized below.

As set out below in detail, there are significant differences in the royalties paid by different services for the 2011-2015 royalty period.  Broadcasters who are streaming their programming on the Internet pay lower per performance royalties than webcasters paying the statutory rate in the first years of the 5 year period, but higher rates at the end of the period. (See a summary of the Broadcaster royalty agreement here).  "Pureplay" webcasters, like Pandora, pay significantly lower per performance royalties than either broadcasters or those paying under the statutory rate, but are required to pay a minimum fee of 25% of the gross revenue of their entire business - ruling out these lower rates as an option for any service that has lines of business other than webcasting.  (See a summary of the Pureplay deal here).  The broadcaster deal and that which applies to the Pureplay webcasters were both arrived at pursuant to settlements reached under the two Webcaster Settlement Acts, passed in 2008 and 2009.  These allowed the groups covered by these agreements to negotiate with SoundExchange over the rates that would cover the industry for the digital noninteractive performances of sound recordings.  The statutory rates were arrived at by a decision of the Copyright Royalty Judges after litigation which took place last year. 

The differing royalty rates for these three groups of webcasters can be summarized as set forth below.

Broadcasters Per Performance Royalties

  • 2011 - $.0017 per performance 
  • 2012 - $.0020 per performance
  • 2013 - $.0022 per performance
  • 2014 - $.0023 per performance
  • 2015 - $.0025 per performance

Statutory Webcasting Per Performance Royalty Rates

  • 2011 - $.0019 per performance
  • 2012 - $.0021 per performance
  • 2013 - $.0021 per performance
  • 2014 - $.0023 per performance
  • 2015 - $.0023 per performance

Pureplay Webcasters Per Performance Royalty Rates

  • 2011 - $.00102 per performance
  • 2012 - $.00110 per performance
  • 2013 - $.00120 per performance
  • 2014 - $.00130 per performance
  • 2015 - $.00140 per performance

As set forth above, there are different aspects to each of these rates that bring different benefits and costs.  Pureplay webcasters pay the higher of the per performance royalties set out above and 25% of their gross revenue for all business lines - hence the name "pureplay", as only businesses that do virtually nothing but webcasting can benefit from these rates.  Broadcasters actually get an additional benefit from their rates that is not available to other webcasters - where they are simulcasting their on-air signals, they need not abide by the Performance Complement - which limits the number of songs from the same artist that other webcasters can play within specified periods (see the details on this waiver here).

What do these rates mean?  On a cost per thousand basis, services playing 10 songs an hour to 1000 listeners would be paying $10.20 per hour under the Pureplay deal, $17.00 an hour under the Broadcaster deal, and $19.00 an hour under the rates set out in the CRB decision.  By 2015, those rates would be $14.00 under the Pureplay deal, $25.00 per hour under the Broadcaster deal, and $23.00 per hour under the CRB decision.  Obviously, to pay for such royalties, broadcaster and statutory webcasters will either need to sell more commercials, or sell at a higher CPM than would a Pureplay webcaster. 

There are other rates available under these and other deals to smaller entities who cannot afford the per performance royalties set out above (though there is always some question about whether the services that pay these per performance royalties can really afford them). For small commercial webcasters with less than $1.25 million in annual revenue, they can pick a percentage of revenue royalty of 10-12% of gross revenues for services with less than 5 million aggregate tuning hours per month, or 12-14% for those with more monthly hours.  Noncommercial services can pay at several different rates - including a royalty structure with limited reporting requirements and higher per performance fess if certain minimum listening levels are exceeded, or one with more reporting but lower royalties after the minimum levels are exceeded (see our comparison, here).  NPR stations have their own deal - where streaming is paid for all affiliated stations by CPB.

It is a confusing royalty world - with services paying differing amounts for essentially the same service.  These rates will be in place until the end of 2015.  After that, who knows what rates will apply - as there will either be new negotiations for new rates, or another CRB proceeding to set rates for the industry. 

Copyright Royalty Board Reaches Determination on Royalty Rates for Webcasting for 2011-2015 - For Internet Radio Operators Not Covered by Webcaster Settlement Act Agreements

The Copyright Royalty Board today released its Determination of Rates for noninteractive webcasting services for the period from 2011-2015. These rates will form the default rates for webcasters who have not opted into one of the many voluntary agreements negotiated last year under the Webcaster Settlement Act (see our summaries of the Pureplay webcaster deal here, the Broadcasters settlement here, the Small Webcasters or "microcaster" settlement here, the noncommercial webcasters settlements here, the Sirius XM settlement here, and the CPB/NPR settlement here).  The Board set the following per performance royalty rates as the default rates for webcasters who are not terrestrial broadcasters:

  • 2011 - $.0019 per performance
  • 2012 - $.0021 per performance
  • 2013 - $.0021 per performance
  • 2014 - $.0023 per performance
  • 2015 - $.0023 per performance

Thus, the rates for this coming year will remain at the same level at which they are now set for 2010, and will increase slightly every other  year.  A performance is one song played to one listener. 

The decision also adopted default rates for noncommercial webcasters, setting those rates at the levels agreed to in a settlement between SoundExchange and certain noncommercial educational webcasters reached last year. Those rates establish a minimum fee of $500 for each individual channel offered by a noncommercial webcaster. If the listening on any channel exceeds 159,140 Aggregate Tuning Hours in any month, the webcaster would pay for such overage on a per performance basis at the following rates:

  • 2011 - $.0017 per performance 
  • 2012 - $.0020 per performance
  • 2013 - $.0022 per performance
  • 2014 - $.0023 per performance
  • 2015 - $.0025 per performance

The Board also set default rates for broadcasters who are streaming, but who had not opted into the NAB SoundExchange settlement agreement entered into in 2009. The rates for broadcasters are identical to those that apply to broadcasters who did opt into that agreement:

  • 2011 - $.0017 per performance
  • 2012 - $.0020 per performance
  • 2013 - $.0022 per performance
  • 2014 - $.0023 per performance
  • 2015 - $.0025 per performance

As most commercial webcasters had opted into settlement agreements, only Live365 litigated the commercial royalty rates in this proceeding against SoundExchange. As in the Webcasting II proceeding decided in 2007, the Judges were to reach a decision based on the standard of what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in a hypothetical marketplace

In reaching its decision in the case, the Copyright Royalty Judges rejected Live365’s proposed rates of $.0009 per performance, finding that the expert testimony that it had relied on, which advanced a model based on the performance of an average webcaster who would want to receive a 20% rate of return (comparable to that achieved by broadcast companies), was not supported by sufficient evidence as to what the typical costs of webcast operations were, nor as to why a hypothtical webcaster in a willing buyer-willing seller model would need to achieve that specific rate of return in order to agree on a particular level of royalty payment. 

The Judges also rejected SoundExchange's proposed rates.  It had advanced a proposal for rates beginning at $.0021 in 2011, and increasing yearly by $.0002 to reach a level of $.0029 in 2015. SoundExchange relied on an expert who took the rates that music services paid for music in the interactive marketplace (where royalties are agreed to in voluntary negotiations between record companies and users, not by a statutory royalty set by the government), and adjusted those rates to determine what he thought would be the rates that were paid without the interactivity. The expert suggested that these would lead to rates as high as $.0036 per performance. The Judges determined that this estimate was too high for several reasons, including the fact that the interactive marketplace was purely a subscription marketplace, and SoundExchange’s expert had not adjusted for the fact that the noninteractive market is primarily a nonsubscription marketplace. 

After finding that these two models did not accurately reflect the current marketplace, the Judges turned to the rates negotiated in Webcaster Settlement Act ("WSA") agreements between SoundExchange and the NAB and Sirius XM (for its webcasting services). The Judges looked at those rates as providing a good indication of what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in a hypothetical marketplace, as these rates represented real deals done by players with somewhat equal market power. Under the terms of the WSA, the Judges were able to consider WSA settlement agreements only where the parties to the agreements had agreed that their terms could be used as precedent.  SoundExchange, the NAB and Sirius XM agreed to the use of their agreements as precedent.  The Pureplay Agreement did not contain terms allowing the lower per-performance rates set out in that agreement to be used as precedent, so the Judges could not consider those lower rates.

The Judges determined that the current rate for 2010 set the lower bound of where the new rates should begin, and felt that some modest increases over time were justified by increased advertising revenues, increased listening, and increased performances being made by webcasters. Thus, the rates were increased at the levels set out above.  The Judges did not consider whether the profits of webcasting companies were also increasing. 

Parties have 15 days to seek a rehearing, and 30 days from the publication of the decision in the Federal Register to seek an appeal from the US Court of Appeals. The new rates do become effective while an appeal is pending but, as the rates for 2011 remain at the levels currently in place for 2010, that should not be an immediate issue for parties affected by this decision. 

In the interests of full disclosure, I acted as co-counsel to Live365 in this proceeding. 

Copyright Office Asks if Federal Protection Should be Extended to Pre-1972 Sound Recordings - What's the Impact on Internet Radio?

The Copyright Office has just released a Notice of Inquiry asking whether Federal protection should be extended to sound recordings recorded prior to 1972.  A sound recording is a song as recorded by a particular artist.  Sound recordings were first protected under Federal law in 1972.  Prior to that, unauthorized recordings or reproductions of an artist's recoding were policed under various state criminal and civil law.  While the Copyright Act has provided for the protection of pre-1972 sound recordings first registered in other countries, US sound recordings recorded prior to 1972, have not received Federal copyright protections.  Many have assumed that this also exempts pre-1972 sound recordings from royalty requirements under Section 114 of the Copyright Act - i.e. the royalties paid by Internet and satellite radio and other digital music providers under the statutory license.  How would a change in the law affect Internet radio operators?

That is one of the questions that is asked by the Notice of Inquiry.  Many Internet radio operators have not excluded pre-1972 recordings from royalty payments based on any exception that may exist for pre-1972 sound recordings, as the possibility has not been widely publicized.  Moreover, some copyright holders have suggested that the digitization of older songs may somehow bring pre-1972 recordings under the coverage of the Copyright Act, or that there may be state remedies that are somehow the equivalent of the Federal public performance right.  Others may just not want to go to the trouble of determining which copyrighted songs are subject to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (making the non-US pre-1972 sound recordings subject to US Federal law).  The Copyright Office's Notice of Inquiry asks what impact the inclusion of pre-1972 sound recordings would have on many undertakings - including the archiving and restoration of sound recordings, and on the current benefits that copyright holders and others enjoy under state laws.  In addition, it asks about the benefits and issues that would arise under Section 114 of the Copyright Act - the section that sets out the statutory license under which most Internet radio companies operate.

This is a complicated issue, and Internet radio operators should carefully consider, with counsel, the issue of whether Section 114 royalties are due for pre-1972 sound recordings.  The issues raised in the Notice shows how complex this issue is, and the question of what to do with pre-1972 sound recordings cannot be resolved by the Copyright Office itself.  Any change in the Copyright Act to fully address the Federal laws that would apply to these sound recordings would have to be made by Congress.  The comments filed in this proceeding will help inform the record that will be created in connection with the Copyright Office making a recommendation to Congress about any suggested change in the law. Comments on this issue are due on December 20, with replies 30 days later. 

Court of Appeals Determines that Launchcast is Not an Interactive Service - Thus Not Needing Direct Licenses From the Record Labels

The question of when a digital music service is “interactive” and therefore requires direct negotiations with a copyright holder in order to secure permission to use a sound recording is a difficult one that has been debated since the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was adopted in 1998. In a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals released today, upholding a jury decision in 2007, the Court concluded that Yahoo’s Launchcast service (now operated by CBS) is not so “interactive” as to take it outside of the statutory royalty despite the fact that the service does customize its music offerings to the tastes of individual listeners. To reach its decision, the Court went through an extensive analysis of both the history of the sound recording copyright and of the details of the criteria used by Launchcast to select music for a stream sent to a specific user. By determining that the service is not interactive, the service need only pay the SoundExchange statutory royalty to secure permission to use all legally recorded and publicly released music.  Had the service been found to be interactive within the meaning of the statute, the service would have to negotiate with each sound recording copyright holder for each and every song that it wanted to use on its service to get specific rights to use each song - potentially resulting in hundreds of negotiations and undoubtedly higher fees than those paid under the statutory license.

The issue in the case turned on an analysis of the DMCA’s definition of an interactive service.  The statute defines an interactive service as one where a user can select a specific song or “receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient.” It is clear that Launchcast did not allow a user to request and hear a specific song.  But, by specifying a genre of music, and by specifying favorite artists and songs and rating other songs played by the service, a listener could influence the music that was provided to it.  Was this ability to influence the music sufficient to make it an “interactive service” and thus take it out of the coverage of the statutory royalty?

After an exhaustive analysis of the process that Launchcast goes through to create a stream for a listener, the Court focused on several facts.  First, the Court found that much of the music in any stream delivered by Launchcast was not music selected by the user in their list of preferred artists and songs, but was instead picked by Launchcast from its vast library of songs using a number of factors. The Court also made clear that listeners had no ability to game the system to make it play more favorites of the listener.  While a listener could skip some songs, and pause a song in the middle of its play, it could not go backwards to replay songs or otherwise make particular songs play more frequently. In short, the Court found that the system was set up so that it would not substitute for the purchase of music as listeners could not get songs or even particular artists when they wanted. The Court used the term “predictability” – and found that the user had no predictability in determining whether or when any specific song would play during any listening session, and thus the service was not a substitute for a purchase of a song.

 

This was important in the Court’s analysis. First, the Court determined that the phrase in the statute defining an interactive stream to be “a transmission specially created for the recipient” was not a model of clarity, and was capable of many interpretations. While the record companies argued that any stream that was created specifically for a user based on the user’s preferences was, by definition, “specially created for the recipient”, the Court found that such a simplistic view could not be sustained.  Instead, the language of the statute has to be interpreted in light of the intent of Congress in the adoption of the statute. The Court went through a thorough analysis of the history of the sound recording royalty and how the DMCA provision at issue here came to be in the 1998 Act. The Court noted that the sound recording performance right was first adopted in the US in 1995 and was intended to be a narrow right, initially being applied only to subscription services. After its adoption, upon fears of piracy on the Internet, the right was expanded three years later to include noninteractive streams. In enacting the broader performance royalty, the DMCA broadened the definition of an interactive stream to include the phrase at issue here, focusing primarily on the issue of digital piracy and the fear that a predictable stream of music would allow digital copying. The Court cites specific language of the House of Representatives report on the DMCA where the House stated that you have an interactive stream “if a transmission recipient is permitted to select particular sound recordings in a prerecorded or predetermined program.”

 

After looking at the history and the way the service functioned, the Court focused on the language of the statute that said that there had to be a “transmission of a program” that was specially created for the user before the program was deemed to be interactive. The definition of a "transmission of a program" looked at the transmission of a program as a whole – to find that there was an interactive transmission of a program one has to look at the entire transmission to see if the entire transmission was created specially for the user. The Court determined that, given the way the Launchcast system was set up, the user was really able to specifically influence only a small number of songs that were played in his or her stream. The vast majority of the songs were selected by Launchcast and would be of the same genre as the listener's preferences, but what the songs would be was not at all predictable. Finding that the user thus had no predictability in the entirety of the program that was transmitted, the Court found that the streams would not significantly substitute for the purchase of specific music, and thus should not be considered interactive in the meaning that Congress intended.

 

The decision is very interesting in the depth of its specific analysis of the methodology for the formation of a playlist by Launchcast, and in its examples of music references sprinkled throughout (references to U2's Joshua Tree CD, to Gordon Lightfoot and the Beatles, and to “‘special requests’ [on AM radio which] represented love-struck adolescents’ attempts to communicate their feelings to that ‘special friend.’” The judges also candidly acknowledge that they are “appointed for life” and thus have varying degrees of familiarity with the technology which they are discussing.

 

What is the impact of the case? It undoubtedly helps solidify the position long taken by webcasters that some degree of user influence is permissible by a service that relies on the statutory license for noninteractive webcasting.  However, the decision was very fact dependent, with few clear boundaries as to what percentage of a stream can be user influenced and what degree that influence can be exercised to remain within the statutory license. Moreover, this is the decision of a single Court of Appeals – albeit an important one sitting in New York, covering the Northeast, and very active on copyright issues. But other cases in other circuits would not be bound by this decision, though they will no doubt find it to be instructive.  But, with other facts, any court might not reach the same decision. Thus, the question of which streams are interactive requiring that a service get a negotiated license from each copyright holder to perform the sound recordings, and which are noninteractive and can be streamed simply by paying SoundExchange the statutory royalty (and I say “simply” with a grain of salt given the multiplicity of options for paying the statutory royalty), will no doubt not be put to rest by this one decision.