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After an exhaustive analysis of the process that Launchcast goes through to create a stream for a listener, the Court focused on several facts.  First, the Court found that much of the music in any stream delivered by Launchcast was not music selected by the user in their list of preferred artists and songs, but was instead picked by Launchcast from its vast library of songs using a number of factors. The Court also made clear that listeners had no ability to game the system to make it play more favorites of the listener.  While a listener could skip some songs, and pause a song in the middle of its play, it could not go backwards to replay songs or otherwise make particular songs play more frequently. In short, the Court found that the system was set up so that it would not substitute for the purchase of music as listeners could not get songs or even particular artists when they wanted. The Court used the term “predictability” – and found that the user had no predictability in determining whether or when any specific song would play during any listening session, and thus the service was not a substitute for a purchase of a song.

This was important in the Court’s analysis. First, the Court determined that the phrase in the statute defining an interactive stream to be “a transmission specially created for the recipient” was not a model of clarity, and was capable of many interpretations. While the record companies argued that any stream that was created specifically for a user based on the user’s preferences was, by definition, “specially created for the recipient”, the Court found that such a simplistic view could not be sustained.  Instead, the language of the statute has to be interpreted in light of the intent of Congress in the adoption of the statute. The Court went through a thorough analysis of the history of the sound recording royalty and how the DMCA provision at issue here came to be in the 1998 Act. The Court noted that the sound recording performance right was first adopted in the US in 1995 and was intended to be a narrow right, initially being applied only to subscription services. After its adoption, upon fears of piracy on the Internet, the right was expanded three years later to include noninteractive streams. In enacting the broader performance royalty, the DMCA broadened the definition of an interactive stream to include the phrase at issue here, focusing primarily on the issue of digital piracy and the fear that a predictable stream of music would allow digital copying. The Court cites specific language of the House of Representatives report on the DMCA where the House stated that you have an interactive stream “if a transmission recipient is permitted to select particular sound recordings in a prerecorded or predetermined program.”

After looking at the history and the way the service functioned, the Court focused on the language of the statute that said that there had to be a “transmission of a program” that was specially created for the user before the program was deemed to be interactive. The definition of a "transmission of a program" looked at the transmission of a program as a whole – to find that there was an interactive transmission of a program one has to look at the entire transmission to see if the entire transmission was created specially for the user. The Court determined that, given the way the Launchcast system was set up, the user was really able to specifically influence only a small number of songs that were played in his or her stream. The vast majority of the songs were selected by Launchcast and would be of the same genre as the listener's preferences, but what the songs would be was not at all predictable. Finding that the user thus had no predictability in the entirety of the program that was transmitted, the Court found that the streams would not significantly substitute for the purchase of specific music, and thus should not be considered interactive in the meaning that Congress intended.

The decision is very interesting in the depth of its specific analysis of the methodology for the formation of a playlist by Launchcast, and in its examples of music references sprinkled throughout (references to U2's Joshua Tree CD, to Gordon Lightfoot and the Beatles, and to “‘special requests’ [on AM radio which] represented love-struck adolescents’ attempts to communicate their feelings to that ‘special friend.’” The judges also candidly acknowledge that they are “appointed for life” and thus have varying degrees of familiarity with the technology which they are discussing.

What is the impact of the case? It undoubtedly helps solidify the position long taken by webcasters that some degree of user influence is permissible by a service that relies on the statutory license for noninteractive webcasting.  However, the decision was very fact dependent, with few clear boundaries as to what percentage of a stream can be user influenced and what degree that influence can be exercised to remain within the statutory license. Moreover, this is the decision of a single Court of Appeals – albeit an important one sitting in New York, covering the Northeast, and very active on copyright issues. But other cases in other circuits would not be bound by this decision, though they will no doubt find it to be instructive.  But, with other facts, any court might not reach the same decision. Thus, the question of which streams are interactive requiring that a service get a negotiated license from each copyright holder to perform the sound recordings, and which are noninteractive and can be streamed simply by paying SoundExchange the statutory royalty (and I say “simply” with a grain of salt given the multiplicity of options for paying the statutory royalty), will no doubt not be put to rest by this one decision. 

The agreement recites that these rates represent a payment computed on the basis of 1/3 of the rate agreed to in the NAB settlement with SoundExchange (here), minus a discount for the ease of collection caused by the single payment from CPB.  If the covered stations stream anywhere near the Music ATH caps set forth above, that discount would be significant.  It is also interesting to note that the deal is, by its terms, not precedential in the upcoming CRB proceeding.  So why this suggestion as to how it was computed was included in the agreement is not clear.

Individual stations have few obligations directly to SoundExchange under this agreement.  It is NPR which makes the election to go forward with this deal, once the CPB Board has approved the deal. It appears that some stations which are major users of music (the top 30% of the users of music among the covered stations) have to provide information about the songs that they play for a majority of their web site performances.  Otherwise, simply complying with the rules on streaming, such as the performance complement (which we described here), and providing some information about songs the station played for limited periods of time each quarter, seem to be all that is required of affiliated stations.

For CPB affiliated stations, this settlement provides security through 2015 to allow them to build their Internet radio audiences.  It certainly is a benefit of being a CPB station - some of the most successful streaming stations on the Internet.

For listening above the 159,140 monthly ATH level, a noncommercial webcaster electing the Religious broadcasters deal would pay at the following rates:  

  (i)   2006-2010:

             (a)        $0.0002176 per performance; or

(b)        $0.00251 per ATH , except in the case of channels or stations where substantially all of the programming is reasonably classified as news, talk, sports or business programming, in which case the royalty rate shall be $.0002 (.02¢) per aggregate tuning hour;

      (ii)        2011-2015:

For large noncommercial webcasters, these rates cut the payments for performances in excess of the 159,140 cap by 2/3 from the rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board in its 2007 decision.  These rates are more in line with the noncommercial rates set under the Small Webcasters Settlement Act, which were in effect prior to 2006 and set rates at 1/3 of the commercial rates for performances in excess of 200 average simultaneous listeners. 

The Educational deal, by contrast, while structured very similarly ($500 per channel minimum and a per performance fee above 159,140 monthly ATH), requires far higher per performance fees.  The fees for performances above the cap are essentially the fees agreed to by the NAB, and which SoundExchange seems to be trying to make the standard for per performance fees that they will use as a benchmark in the upcoming proceeding to set royalties for 2011-2015.  The rates under the Educational deal are deemed precedential (while those under the Religious broadcasters deal are not).  For streaming above 159,140 ATH per month, the Educational webcaster would pay the following per performance rates:

                      Year         Rate per Performance

2011                      $0.0017

2012                      $0.0020

2013                      $0.0022

2014                      $0.0023

                        2015                      $0.0025

With the Educational Webcaster paying 3 times what a noncommercial entity would pay under the Religious Broadcasters deal, why would anyone ever elect the Educational deal?  For one reason - its treatment of recordkeeping requirements for smaller webcasters.  Apparently, recognizing that many schools will have webcasting operations which may receive some degree of listening, but which may not get the large nationwide audiences of some religious or other nationally-focused nonprofit webcasters, the Educational webcasters seem to have traded higher per performance rates above the 159,140 cap to get a bigger break on recordkeeping requirements for smaller webcasters.

Under the Educational Webcaster deal, stations streaming up to 55,000 ATH per month can pay an additional $100 yearly fee to SoundExchange and be exempt from recordkeeping and reporting requirements on the songs that they play.  The $100 fee is supposed to be used by SoundExchange to develop alternate methods of sampling and reporting the music played by these smaller webcasters.  55,000 monthly ATH is approximately 76 average simultaneous listeners 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

In contrast, while there is a "Noncommercial Microcaster" option under the Religious Broadcasters settlement which allows for a similar recordkeeping exemption, it applies to stations with up to 44,000 ATH per year, meaning a station can average only 5 simultaneous listeners on a 24 hour a day, seven day a week basis to qualify for the recordkeeping exemption under that deal.

Under both deals, webcasters agree to provide census reporting (reporting to SoundExchange each song played and how many times it was listened to), but only for larger webcasters exceeding the 159,140 ATH per month cap.  Here, again, there is slightly more flexibility for the Educational webcaster, not having to report on the number of listeners for each song, instead only having to report how often the song was played.  Large webcasters under the Religious Broadcasters deal do need to report on the number of listeners (though that information can be provided by ATH rather than on a per performance basis).  Under both deals, webcasters with less than 159,140 need only report for two weeks each quarter.

Parties deciding to elect the Religious Broadcasters deal must do so by September 15.  There is no comparable deadline for the Educational deal, as it covers only the periods after January 1, 2011, except for stations wishing to take advantage of the recordkeeping benefits, which can be elected immediately for 2009, and in January for 2010.  Under both deals, elections must be made every year, by January 31, as to whether or not a webcaster wants to continue to be covered by one of these deals.  The Educational deal is open only to those webcasters who are affiliated with educational institutions.

Thus, there are now two options (in addition to a third option for stations eligible for funding by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and to the option the Copyright Royalty Board adopted for 2006-2010 and any option that they may adopt for 2011-2015) for the noncommercial webcaster.  One option provides more recordkeeping breaks for Educational institutions that stream a moderate amount, while the other provides price breaks for the largest noncommercial webcasters.  Read these deals carefully when they are published in the Federal Register, and carefully choose the option that best meets your needs. 

These rates are two one-hundredths of a penny per performance lower than the CRB rates in 2009 and 2010, but one one-hundredth of a penny higher than the rates agreed to by the NAB for these years.  The CRB has yet to set what is in effect the default rate - the rate that a party pays if they don't elect to be covered by one of the other available deals - for 2011-2015.  Under the NAB deal, the rates remain one one-hundredth of a penny cheaper than this Sirius XM deal in 2011.  The NAB rates are identical to this deal in 2012, but the NAB rates are one one-hundredth of a penny more expensive than under this settlement for 2013-2015.  Seemingly, webcasters electing this deal trade a slightly higher royalty now for one slightly lower in the future.

The deal also requires a yearly $500 per channel minimum fee, capped at $50,000. As in all other deals, this minimum fee is applied to the per performance royalties that the service incurs.

The deal must be elected by a webcaster currently in operation within 15 days of the date that this Agreement is published in the Federal Register - a shorter period than allowed under some of the previous deals.  Once it is elected, a webcaster is bound for the remainder of the period through 2015, and not able to opt out should some lower rates be available under a future CRB decision  (note that this is different than under the Pureplay deal, where a webcaster can opt out at the end of any year).  Any party making the election to be covered by this deal must drop out of any litigation over the rates for 2011-2015.  As is becoming standard on many of these deals, royalty payments and reports of use are due 45 days after the end of each month of operation. 

One other important aspect of this agreement is that it can be used as precedent in the upcoming CRB proceeding for rates for 2011-2015.  The NAB deal also has a similar provision, allowing it to be considered to be of precedential value.  On the other hand, lower rates agreed to in the Pureplay and Microcasters deals are specifically labeled nonprecedential.  We wrote about the concerns expressed to the Senate Judiciary committee about the ability of SoundExchange to dictate which deals are precedential and which are not, here.

Finally, it is important to note that this deal covers Sirius XM's Internet streaming of its programming, not its satellite delivered music programming from which it received the bulk of its revenues.  Royalties for the use of music in that programming is paid on a percentage of revenue basis of between 6 and 8% of revenues - a rate set by the CRB and recently upheld by the Court of Appeals.  As we have written, the difference in these royalties is due to the difference in the standard applied under the Copyright statute to the determination of royalty rates for different services - leading to calls for "platform parity", as considered by the Senate last week.

All in all, for those webcasters who are not broadcasters and not pureplay webcasters, and don't qualify as small webcasters under the Microcaster or Pureplay deals, this agreement may present some options for the future.  Watch for its publication in the Federal Register in the near future. 

In the actual discussions of the royalty, several issues were repeatedly raised, which we try to deal with in more detail in subsequent posts.  These include the following:

• Supporters of the royalty contended that fears of the royalty's impact on small broadcasters and noncommercial operators were dealt with by the House of Representatives' version of the legislation by imposing a small, flat yearly fee as low as $500 per year on these stations.  Senator Leahy made the point that this royalty was probably less than most stations were paying for their NAB dues to lobby against the royalty.  Steve Newberry, Chair of the NAB Joint Board and the owner of a group of small market radio stations, submitted that, while $500 today seemed like a small amount, these numbers have a way of going up.  After all, 10 years ago when the sound recording performance royalty for digital operators was first adopted by Congress, radio was supposed to be totally exempt - yet here we are, arguing for a change in that exemption.
• Supporters of the royalty constantly made the argument that broadcasters were using their "property" without compensation, or agreement.  Newberry argued that they were getting fair compensation through the promotion of their work by broadcast stations - a partnership that has produced the most significant music industry in the world.  Senator Durbin of Illinois suggested that there was no longer any agreement to the partnership between broadcasters and artists, as the artists were no longer agreeing to allow their music to be used without compensation.  Yet the system being proposed by Congress - a statutory royalty - would still deprive artists of choice - a choice to opt out of the royalty and allow their music to be played for free to promote airplay, especially if broadcasters have to pay a percentage of revenue for the royalty (if the percentage is not reduced by playing music where the royalty is waived, broadcasters will have no incentive to play that royalty free music, so artists do not have the choice to try to increase airplay through a royalty waiver)
• Supporters of the royalty argued that most industrialized nations had the royalty, and that US artists were not getting their share of royalties when US music was played in overseas markets.  Performing rights organizations in those countries do not pay US artists for the performance of their works since the US will not pay foreign artists for the performance of their works on over-the-air radio.  Newberry pointed to the differing copyright standards in other countries (such as a 50 year protection for copyrighted works, rather than the 99 year copyright in the US).  His written testimony also pointed to efforts in several countries to reform their royalty system, as the system inhibited the playing of new music.   The written testimony also made the point that, as the US will still have not adopted a full performance royalty (as performances in bars and restaurants, stadiums and concert halls, and other public venues still will not be covered), there still will be no full performance royalty, so foreign countries may still withhold their payments to US artists. 

An interesting suggestion was raised by Texas Senator Cornyn that has perhaps been dismissed by too many parties too quickly.  Cornyn suggested that, rather than compelling a performance royalty, Congress should set up a "Do Not Play" list, similar to a do not call list.  The list would be made up of those artists who do not give their consent to radio stations playing their music without the payment of a royalty.  Thus, radio stations would have to negotiate with artists on this list to get the rights to play their music.  Stations could play the music of all other artists without a royalty.  This proposal was dismissed by some in attendance at the hearing for a number of reasons.  It was argued that small market radio stations might have a problem negotiating for carriage of major stars and, as suggested by Senator Durbin, that it would set artists and composers against each other, as the composer might want the song played, while the artist might not.  Finally, Ralph Oman, the former registrar of Copyrights, suggested that it would harm small artists that felt that they needed to give up their rights to get airplay.  We will address these arguments in a subsequent post.  But the idea is interesting in that many Internet radio operators have discussed the potential for getting artist waivers to reduce their SoundExchange fees (see our post here).  Issues with setting up a pool of royalty-free music include concerns over assuring that artists who waive fees have the right to do so, and also the simple logistics of contacting enough artists to make such a waiver system worthwhile.  If the government were to set it up, with appropriate safeguards, these issues might be eliminated. 

The issue of platform parity for the standards used to determine the royalties paid by various users of music was also raised at the hearing.  Bob Kimball, from Real Networks, argued that any bill addressing a performance royalty should also address the disparity in royalty rates and standards used in setting the sound recording performance royalty.  In this discussion, issues that were raised include:

• Whether it was fair that small broadcasters, with up to $1.25 million in revenue, would pay $5000 or less in sound recording performance royalties, while Internet radio companies with $1.25 million in revenue would pay $150,000 in royalties.  While some suggested that FCC licensees have greater costs imposed by FCC obligations that justified a lower fee, Kimball asked how that cost disparity could possibly justify royalties 30 times as high as proposed for small broadcasters.
• The question of whether the 801(b) standard (about which we wrote earlier this week) or some other standard was appropriate.  Shelia E, testifying for the MusicFirst coalition, seemed to agree that a modified 801(b) standard, as proposed in the House of Representatives bill on the broadcast performance royalty, made sense for all music users. 
• Kimball also raised the question of whether it was fair that some settlements on Internet radio royalties reached under the Webcasters Settlement Act were considered to be precedential for purposes of the next CRB proceeding, while other settlements were considered nonprecedential - seemingly at the choice of SoundExchange.  Kimball suggested that all should be precedential, or all should be excluded, but that private parties should not get to choose which settlements should be considered in setting future rates.

Finally, a question was raised as to the precedent that any sound recording royalty would set for the public performance royalty for the musical work - the right to the song's composition as paid to ASCAP, BMI and SESAC.  The ASCAP and BMI royalties, if they cannot be negotiated, are set by a rate court which acts somewhat like the Copyright Royalty Board in making a determination of what a fair rate for the royalty should be (see our story on one such decision, here).  At the hearing, Mr. Kimball suggested that there was language in the House version of the Performance Royalty bill that suggested that sound recording performance royalties could set a precedent for ASCAP and BMI to raise rates, but that they could not be used by music services to argue that the ASCAP and BMI rates be lowered.  This might be an important issue not just for digital music services, but also for broadcasters who are currently in negotiations about the ASCAP and BMI rates for periods after the end of this year.

Nothing was resolved at the hearing, though much was discussed. The Committee, like the Judiciary Committee in the House, seems ready to move on the legislation.  But whether the full Senate will act is perhaps as big of a question as whether the House will.  This issue is not over (as we wrote here), so keep watching and see what develops. 

The Copyright Office had recently issued a determination that ringtones and digital downloads were covered by this royalty, and could rely on the Section 115 compulsory copyright.  Again, in those contexts, copies were fairly easy to understand, as a copy is made when a ringtone or download is copied onto a phone or a computer, and when that happens, a specific fee is charged for the copy that is made.  The more difficult questions arise in cases of subscription services, limited time downloads, on-demand streaming, and even streaming done by a non-interactive service like an Internet radio station.  When is a "phonorecord" - a specifically identifiable copy of a recording that contains the musical work - made?  In the digital transmission process, multiple copies are made - on the servers of the music services, in transitory copies made by servers and routers on the Internet, and in the RAM and on the hard drive of the listener's computer.  Are these copies "specifically identifiable" such that a royalty should be paid?  In its Public Notice of this Roundtable, the Copyright Office raised many of these issues that formed the basis of the discussion on Friday.

 In 2003, the Recording Industry and the representatives of the music publishers entered into a settlement agreement that concluded that the non-interactive streaming did not involve copies that would give rise to a mechanical royalty, while interactive streaming and conditional downloads did.  However, as discussed at the Roundtable, the Harry Fox agency, the principal collection agent for the music publishing companies, represents less than 70% of the music publishers, so the agreement is not binding on all publishers.  Moreover, the Copyright Office representatives themselves asked at the Roundtable how they could draw a legal distinction between on-demand streaming and non-interactive streaming, when the technology involved was the same.  While the making of a copy in the streaming process may currently have no real value independent from the public performance (for which ASCAP, BMI and SESAC collect royalties for the musical composition), the Copyright Office asked if there should not at least be a recognition that a copy is made.  Questions even arose as to whether specifically identifiable copies are made in other digital transmissions that include buffer copies.

The question arose as to whether any copy made in a streaming process is specifically identifiable, and also whether the payment of such a royalty would be "double-dipping" - paying the composers twice for the use of their music.  In a recent decision in a Federal Court, a decision was rendered that ASCAP (and by implication BMI and SESAC) were not entitled to public performance royalties in connection with downloads, as no public performance was involved.  The question discussed on Friday was whether the reverse shouldn't also be true - that there is no mechanical royalty where there is a clear public performance.

Issues also exist as to the efficient operation of the statutory license.  The license requires notice to the copyright holder before it can be used, and as many of the copyright holders are difficult to find, and as there is no central database where the music publishers are identified, that is difficult.  In addition, as the Harry Fox agency, the one central licensing agency that exits, represents less than 70% of the copyright holders, a company that has a business model that doesn't allow for the per copy statutory royalty (e.g. a subscription service), doesn't have any group or groups with which it can negotiate to get blanket licenses for virtually the entire musical universe.  Thus,  licensing is difficult.

Everyone at the Roundtable agreed that the statutory language was ambiguous and did not cover all of the issues that arise in a digital world.  The Copyright Office itself has asked for legislative reform of the statutory license many times, to clarify these ambiguities.  In fact, at one point, the Register of Copyrights testified that she thought that one agency should collect all royalties for musical compositions, so that there would not be the issue of double dipping, and so that there would be organizations that would represent virtually all of the copyright holders for all purposes.   With the various entrenched stakeholders, that proposal didn't fly, thus we continue to have different groups representing composers for the public performance of music and for the mechanical royalty.  And, while we have had proposals for Section 115 reform floated in Congress for the last several years, the discussion on Friday was that Congressional action did not look imminent.  But all companies providing digital transmissions of musical compositions should continue to monitor these efforts, as the potential for problems arising from interpretations of who needs to get paid for digital services remains very high, and with the potential liabilities for copyright infringement being so great, the stakes are high.