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ASCAP and BMI, which are the largest of the performing rights organizations - together controlling an estimated 85 or 90 per cent of the musical compositions - are subject to antitrust consent decrees.  They can't discriminate between music rights holders, and must offer the same licenses to similarly situated services, i.e. they must charge all webcasters according to set formulas - they can't cut deals with individual webcasters and offer them better deals, unless such deals are open to all that have similar qualifications.  Moreover, the rates that they charge are subject to government oversight by a "rate court" - a Federal District Court judge who can hold a trial to determine the reasonableness of any proposed rate.  This oversight is required by the antitrust consent decrees that govern both ASCAP and BMI.

As we have written before, SESAC, the smallest of the current PROs, is not subject to rate court review for its rates, nor is it restricted from "cutting deals" on the rates that it charges.  It is a private company, not subject to any antitrust consent decree.  Some music users have, from time to time, suggested that SESAC be brought under such decrees - including a group of TV stations that filed a lawsuit a year ago seeking to impose antitrust scrutiny on SESAC.  As SESAC is often able to require royalties from users that seem higher than those that would be due to it if it was paid on a strictly pro rata basis, these kinds of concerns arise from time to time.

But SESAC is still a fairly large organization, in business for a long time, and most media companies are accustomed to dealing with it.  EMI, and any other publisher that follows its lead, would seemingly be in a position similar to that of SESAC, and not be covered by the antitrust consent decrees.  Thus, any such publisher could charge what it wanted for the public performance right to the compositions that it controls, and even charge different services different amounts.  And it may be difficult for licensees to realize that they have to deal with a new organization or organizations to license music, and it will make it harder to determine which songs a music service has licensed or which ones it already has the rights to use.  Some webcasters are still are surprised that they have to pay SoundExchange, which has been around in one form or another for a decade, so how will they get the word that they now can't rely on ASCAP, BMI and SESAC for all their public performance needs for musical compositions?  While ASCAP's amended regulations (see Section 1.12 of those regulations dealing with this New Media opt-out) provide that ASCAP will must notify all New Media services when any publisher decides to avail itself of this New Media opt-out, and what songs will be licensed directly, as SoundExchange has itself found out, such notices often don't command the attention that one might think that they would. 

Collective licensing was developed to provide a one-stop shop to clear vast catalogs of music.  Many feel that it is necessary for those users - like a webcaster - who needs acceess to a broad array of music in order to operate its business.  When the sound recording performance royalty was first established in the 1990s, it came with a mandatory collective licensing approach (the "statutory license"), so that all users could easily determine how to pay for the music that they use, without needing to deal with every rights holder - perhaps having to negotiate a different deal with each one.  As we wrote here, that is why Internet radio has had the Beatles catalog for so long, even though interactive digital music services, which don't have a compulsory collective license only recently have been able to obtain such licenses.

If music publishers associated with record labels generally start to exercise their rights to withdraw their catalog from the PROs, it's possible that they could even exert more control over the use of the sound recordings.  If, for instance, they control both the publishing and the master recording (the sound recording) rights to a particular band's music, and they feel that the statutory sound recording performance royalties set by the Copyright Royalty Board are too low for a particular recording, they can effectively block the use of that sound recording by extracting a higher price for the musical composition the next time the license for that composition becomes due.  One could even see different prices being charged for the rights to different musical compositions (in fact, most Beatles compositions are held by EMI - so it is possible that every Internet radio operator will not have access to their recordings if this combined licensing scheme goes into effect).   While the efficiencies claimed by the publisher might exist in the case of some interactive services, or in cases where you are dealing with a very limited number of songs (e.g. negotiations to use the music in video productions), for traditional Internet radio services, the efficiencies seem to diminish, not increase.

Just what digital services are affected by this move?  Broadcasters do not seem to have to worry about this development, as the amendment to ASCAP's regulations allowing this partial withdrawal from its licensing system excluded them (and the definition of "broadcaster" under the antitrust conset decree (see Section II(f)), seems to exclude cable and direct broadcast satellite as well, as indicated in ASCAP's press release on the matter.  This exclusion would seemingly include broadcaster's Internet simulcast's of their over-the-air programming.  But other digital music services that are subject to Sections 114 (webcasters), 115 ("DPD", or "digital phonorecord deliveries", i.e. copies or reproductions of musical compositions made digitally) and 106(1) (other digital reproductions by audio services), are all covered. 

This is an evolving story.  There are many questions that remain.  One unanswered question is exactly which songs are covered by this opt-out.  Another is how it will affect the rates charged by ASCAP.  Finally, the practical effect remains to be seen.  It may well be that this new system will in fact prove more efficient, or will provide benefits to users and composers - or it may impose some of the burdens that I describe above.  Until this is all sorted out, music companies will need to watch carefully to ensure that they license the music they need - from the proper places.  More on some of the other issues involved in digital music licensing can be found in our advisory - The Basics of Music Licensing in a Digital World. 

NOTE:  Corrected 5/10/2011 to note that ASCAP, and not the music publishing company, sends out the notices to the services of a New Media opt out when a publisher decides to exercise it right to opt out of the normal ASCAP licensing scheme. 

The Court decision rejected SoundExchange's challenges to the decision of the Board to apply the 801(b) factor which instructed it to take into account the impact of the royalty on the stability of the industry.  The application of this factor resulted in a royalty that grows from 6 to 8%, reducing what might have been a royalty in the range of 13% had the Board relied solely on its assessment of fair market value.  Among other issues, the Court rejected SoundExchange's claim that the XM-Sirius merger should have been taken into account to mitigate against any need for this factor to be taken into account.  The Court also rejected the Board's decision to exclude from revenues subject to the royalty those revenues that came from non-music services, like revenue from advertising on non-music channels or from equipment purchases. 

The only issue that the Court did not resolve was the value of the Section 112 ephemeral royalty - the royalty that is to compensate copyright holders for the temporary transitory copies made in the streaming process, such as those made on servers.  The Board found that no one had shown any value for those transitory copies, and thus the royalty had no real market value, so any residual value was subsumed entirely within the Section 114 royalty.  After the Board issued its decision, the Copyright Office issued an opinion that the Board needed to set a separate royalty for the ephemeral right.  While the satellite radio companies suggested the value was zero, and SoundExchange argued that it should be 8.8% of the total royalty, the Court could find no evidence supporting either position.  So the Court remanded this issue to the Board to determine what percentage of the royalty, if any, should be allocated to the ephemeral rights.

This decision, coming as it does on the date that webcasters announce a settlement with royalties that range from 12% of gross revenues to 25% or more of such revenues, demonstrates again the difference that a standard can make.  The 801(b) standard, taking into account the public interest factors, produces a rate that the music users can actually support (as the satellite companies did here, not appealing the decision of the CRB, but instead arguing in support of it), while the "wiling buyer, willing seller" standard produces royalties which, even after a settlement substantially reducing the royalty, brings only grudging relief.  This issue should be assessed by Congress when it reviews the Copyright Royalty Board's status if, as suggested by this Court, the webcasting court finds the CRB to be unconstitutional. 

This settlement applies only to subscription services of a particular type.  This proceeding was begun when XM, Sirius and MTV all announced plans to offer audio services that are provided  as an add-on to a subscription to multichannel video providers (essentially cable and Direct Broadcast satellite television providers).  As these services cannot technologically track individual performances or listeners, they cannot pay according to the Internet radio decision.  Thus, a new proceeding was begun by the CRB to determine the rates to be paid by these services. 

Internet-based subscription services are not covered by this decision, but instead pay the royalties that apply to Internet radio services that were decided in March - if the subscription service is non-interactive (i.e. a listener cannot pick what songs he wants to hear) and otherwise meets the rules that apply under the statutory license (see our memo, here, for the details of those requirements).  Internet-based services that are interactive or otherwise don't meet the requirements of the statutory license must obtain clearances directly from the copyright owners, paying a privately negotiated rate. 

The fact that two settlements, one providing rates that are double the amount of the other when the only effective difference between the services was whether they were in existence at the time the governing statute was written fuels complaints about the arbitrary nature of the Copyright Royalty process.  While SoundExchange and other copyright holders have asked for "fairness" in seeking a performance royalty on broadcasters (who currently do not pay such a royalty), they benefit from the unfairness in circumstances such as this, when identical services pay royalties that are twice that paid by existing services.  And, to the extent that all services are deemed to be part of a single broad market for audio services, as some have argued, is there really justification for different treatment between subscription, nonsubscription, Internet and non-Internet based services?  When the rates that apply to satellite radio are decided in the next month, will we see these differences manifest themselves yet again?

These are not questions for the Copyright Royalty Board to decide - they only need to approve this agreement and are not charged with the broader responsibility of assessing the difference in policy between similar services.   Comments on this settlement are due on December 10.

SoundExchange's recent discussions of the issues seem to accept the fact that the royalties will put much of the advertising-supported Internet radio industry out of business.  Initially, when the decision was first released, the public responses of SoundExchange seemed to be that the industry was crying wolf - that it could really afford these rates.  That claim is not heard as often any more.  As more evidence was advanced to show that the royalties would exceed the revenues of most ad-supported webcasters, the next argument advanced by SoundExchange seemed to be that it accepted that most webcasters would go out of business, but it was the webcasters' own fault because of their lousy business models.  That too seems to have quieted, as Congress seems to want there to be diversity among webcasters(see our article about the settlement offer made to small webcasters after Congressional pressure).  Now, it seems that illegal file sharing has become the principal justification for the rate - almost as if the claim is that if the record industry is suffering so should the Internet radio industry.

Of course, there are other justifications offered for the rate - that the decision is one that was legally arrived at and should therefore be followed, that big webcasters can indeed afford the high rates, that the copyright belongs to the artists and labels and they ought to be able to do what they want with it.  We will see in the next 30 days how all these arguments play out.  We will be exploring these issues on a panel I will be moderating at the Digital Media Conference in Silver Spring, Maryland on Friday, June 22.  The panel will feature representatives from SoundExchange, from NPR and DiMA, and Kurt Hanson from Accuradio and the Radio and Internet Newsletter.  If you plan to be in the DC area on Friday and are interested in this issue, you may want to attend.